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The purpose of this thesis is threefold:
(1) To explore the evolution of the financial management
system in the Department of Defense and how the Department of
the Navy interfaces with the current process.
(2) To examine development of the Naval Reserve role in
the Navy's emerging Total Force Policy.
(3) To evaluate progress with key Naval Reserve manage-
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A key element of current U. S. national
security strategy is the concept of "total
force planning" : using all appropriate
resources-both U. S. and Free World-to capi-
talize on the potential of available assets.
For U. S. military forces, this means con-
current consideration of total forces, active
and reserve, to determine the most advantageous
mix to support national strategy /^Ref. l_/
t
Direct spending on reserve forces has
increased over the past four years from
$2.6 billion in fiscal year 1970 to a peak
of $^+.^ billion in fiscal 197^ . Furthermore,
the reserve budget is consuming an increasing
share of defense spending, reaching a high of
over 5 percent in fiscal 197^ /~Ref . 1_7.
Deep rivalries have traditionally existed
between the active and reserve military
factions in each service. The natural
cleavage between professional and citizen
soldiers widens in the face of a sbrinking_^
availability of defense resources /"Ref . l7.
Three facts of life that are of major importance to the
United States Navy are embodied in the statements quoted
above. First, the Navy must adhere to the Nation's Total
Force Policy. Second, the Naval Reserve is being funded to
play a vital role in the Navy's Total Force Policy. Third,
Regulars and Reserves must work together as a well-coordinated
team if the Navy's Total Force Policy is to be a reality.
The purpose of this thesis is threefold:
(1) To explore the evolution of the financial management
system in the Department of Defense and how the Department
of the Navy interfaces with the current process.
12

(2) To examine development of the Naval Reserve role in
the Navy's emerging Total Force Policy.
(3) To evaluate progress with key Naval Reserve manage-
ment problems which affect attainment of the Navy's Total
Force Policy.
Chapter II, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE/DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, seeks to accomplish the
first purpose; Chapter III, THE NAVAL RESERVE AND THE TOTAL
FORCE POLICY, seeks to accomplish the second purpose;
Chapter IV, MANAGEMENT OF THE NAVAL RESERVE, seeks to
accomplish the third purpose; and Chapter V, CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, seeks to suggest further possibilities
for improving some aspects of the problems encountered in
Naval Reserve Management under the Navy's Total Force Policy,
13

II. FINANCIAL MANA GEMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE/DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
A. THE EVOLUTION OF BUDGETING IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The "budget of an organization is an
expression in financial terms of a plan
for carrying out the organization program
objectives for a specified period of time.
The budget Is an instrument of planning,
decision-making, and subsequent control
^~Ref. 2J7.
"Planning, decision-making, and subsequent control" have
been identified by Robert Anthony /~Ref . 3_7 as three distinct
administrative processes:
(1) Strategic Planning : The process of deciding on
objectives., of the organization, on changes in these objectives,
on the resources used to attain these objectives, and on the
policies that are to govern the acquisition, use, and dispo-
sition of these resources.
(2) Management Control : The process by which managers
assure that resources are obtained and used effectively and
efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization's
objectives
.
(3) Operational Control : The process of assuring that
specific tasks are carried out effectively and efficiently.
Budgeting has always been a process for systematically
relating expenditure of funds to accomplishment of planned
objectives and all budgets entail some degree of planning,
management, and control. However, a well-balanced recognition
14

of and emphasis on these three processes as standard
procedure remains an elusive accomplishment in the Federal
Government
.
1 . Budget R e form
...a modern government is concerned
with the broad objectives of defense; law
and order; health, education and welfare,
economic development, and the conduct of
business operations (Post Office) . . .No
government, whatever its resources, can
avoid the need for compromises among these
objectives .. .Society benefits to the extent
that resource allocation choices are made in
the light of the fullest possible information
concerning their implications .. .The function
of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System
(PPBS) is to make the necessary compromises
among various objectives /~Ref . ^__7.
Budget reform in the Federal Government has long-
standing antecedents. Three successive stages of major
reform beginning in the early 1900s and continuing to the
present, can be identified. Each of these reforms has
attempted to incorporate another dimension of the planning-
management-control balance in the budgeting process.
a. Line-Item Budgeting
The first stage of budget reform lasted roughly
from the early 1920s through the Depression. The primary
task during this period centered on developing an adequate
system of expenditure control. In an age when personnel and
purchasing controls were unreliable, the main consideration
was the prevention of administrative improprieties. Since
the detailed itemization of objects-of-expenditure provided
the fund utilization visibility being sought, line-item




With the appearance cf New Deal policies and
programs, Government activities and expenditures grew rapidly.
The commensurate increase in line-item objects-of-expenditure
led to a process of aggregation. This resulted in attention
being focused on the problems of managing large problems and
organizations. In 19^-9 "the Hoover Commission called for
alterations in budget classifications consonant with a
management orientation. It recommended that "the whole
budgetary concept of the Federal Government should be
refashioned by the adoption of a budget based upon functions,
activities, and projects /~Ref
. 3_J7»" This concept, which
was labeled "performance budgeting" , added the dimension of
management control to the existing dimension of operational
control in budgeting practices.
c. Program Eudgeting
Whereas line- item budgeting had a control orien-
tation, and performance budgeting had a management orientation,
program budgeting, which characterizes the present stage of
reform, stresses planning. As Allen Snick points out in his
article, "The Road to PPB" /~Ref. 3_7, three important
developments influenced the evolution from a management to
a planning emphasis:
(1) Economic analysis, macro and micro, has had




(2) The development of new informational and
decisional technologies has enlarged the applicability of
objective analysis to policy making.
(3) There has been a gradual convergence of the
planning and budgetary processes.
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System now in effect in
the Department of Defense is the application to budget
practices of a rule formulated by economist Arthur Smithies.
This rule states that "expenditure proposals should be
considered in the light of the objectives they are intended
to further, and, in general, final expenditure decisions
should not be made until all claims on the budget can be
considered /~Ref . 3_7."
2. POD Planning-Programming-Budgeting System
When I took office in January, 1961,
President Kennedy instructed me to:
1. Develop the force structure
necessary to meet our military requirements
without regard to arbitrary budget
ceilings
.
2. Procure and operate this force at
the lowest possible cost /~Ref . 5_A
ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Several significant changes were made in the financial
management practices of the Department of Defense during
Mr. McNamara's time in office. Many of these changes were
initiated by Charles J. Hitch during his four-and-a-half
years as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) . They
included development of the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP)




At the time Mr. Hitch took office, the Department of
Defense financial management system could not directly
provide data relating costs to major military missions.
Planning was performed in terms of the "outputs" of the
Defense Department (missions, weapon systems, and military
units or forces)
,
but "budgeting was done in terms of the
"inputs" (personnel, operation and maintenance, procurement,
construction, etc.), and there was no method for translating
one into the other. In the spring of I96I Mr. Hitch proposed
a programming system to Mr. McNamara that was to bridge the
gap between planning and budgeting /~Ref. 6_J . In January
I962 the FY 1963 Defense Budget was submitted to Congress in
terms of the newly installed system and the Department of
Defense Planning-Programming-Budgeting System was underway.
3 • POD Resource Management Systems and Project PRIME
In I965 when Robert N. Anthony took office as
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) , there was a
proliferation of uncoordinated management systems in use in
the Department of Defense /~Ref . lj. Secretary of Defense
McNamara assigned four major tasks to Mr. Anthony:
(1) develop a system for management inventory and
capital acquisitions,
(2) develop a top management reporting system,
(3) improve management education and motivation so
that the new systems would be put to effective use and,
(k) make major changes in programming, budgeting,
and accounting systems by the start of FY 1968 on 1 July I96?
18

a. Resource Management Systems (RMSs)
The overall program of coordinating and improving
DOD management systems was called Resource Management Systems
(NOTE: This term is not to be confused with the term Resource
Management System, or RMS, which refers to Project PRIME,
implemented on 1 July I968) . Resource Management Systems was
defined /"Ref. 7_7 as those methods and procedures used
throughout the Department of Defense that:
(1) deal with RESOURCES (manpower, real property,
weapons, equipment, services, materials, and supplies),
(2) are intended to assist in the MANAGEMENT of
these resources (planning, programming, budgeting, acqui-
sition, use, consumption, storage, and disposition), and
.(3) constitute SYSTEMS (involve recurring,
orderly cycles of planning, reporting, and feedback infor-
mation) .
Resource Management Systems affect the entire management
process in the Department of Defense.
b. Project PRIME (RMS)
Project PRIME was the name given to that portion
of the Resource Management Systems effort that was to have
been accomplished by I July 1967 (see Appendix A). Project
PRIME was the core activity in instituting Resource Manage-
ment Systems. It was concerned with operating resources as
contrasted with investment resources. It sought to revise
existing programming, budgeting and accounting systems
dealing primarily with resources financed under the Operation
19

and Maintenance and Military Personnel appropriations as
opposed to the Procurement, Construction, or RDT&E Appropri-
ations .




The DOD planning, programming, and budgeting process
is designed to ensure that decisions regarding National Defense
result in actions that implement those decisions. The basic
approach is as follows:
- collect intelligence.
- appraise the threat.
- develop strategy based on national policy to meet
the threat.
- determine force levels to support the strategy.
- program weapon systems, manpower, and support over
a period of time to attain fiscally constrained force levels.
- budget annual allocations of funds to procure men
and materials required to carry out programs.
2. Cycle
The DOD PPBS operates on an 18-month cycle; however,
the system is recycled annually and an overlap results.
Budgeting for one year, programming for the following year,
and planning for the succeeding years occur simultaneously.
The cycle involves the following basic steps /~Ref. 8_J7» "the
timing of which is promulgated by SECDEF annually in the




(1) JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) submits Joint
Strategic Objectives Plan, Volume I (JSOP I-Strategy) to the
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
.
(2) SECDEF issues Defense Policy and Planning
Guidance (DPPG) to JCS and the Military Departments.
(3) SECDEF issues Material Support Planning Guidance
(MSPG) to JCS and the Military Departments.
(*0 JCS submits JSOP II (Forces) to SECDEF.
(5) SECDEF issues Planning and Programming Guidance
Memorandum (PPGM) to JCS and the Military Departments.
(6) JCS submits Joint Force Memorandum (JFM) to
SECDEF
.
(7) Military Departments submit Program Objectives
Memorandum (POM) to SECDEF.
(8) SECDEF issues Program Decision Memorandum (PDM)
to Military Departments.
(9) Military Departments submit budget estimates
for budget year.
(10) SECDEF issues Program/Budget Decisions (PBD)
.
(11) Military Departments submit Eudgets to SECDEF.
(12) Budget Review conducted among the Office of
Management and Budget (0MB), SECDEF, and Military Departments
(13) Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) updated.
(14) Defense Budget submitted to the President.
(15) President submits Budget to Congress.
(16) Congress reviews Budget and makes appropriations
for the budget year.
21

3 • Navy Programming; Process
a. Programming
The planning required to project the Navy's needs
for several years into the future is accomplished through the
planning and programming system. CNO manages the Navy's
participation in the DOD PPB System and the related Department
of the Navy Programming System. Program sponsors are desig-
nated within CNO's organization to prepare, review, and
generally monitor all actions which affect their assigned
areas of responsibility. Over-all coordination and operation
of the programming system is assigned to the Director, Navy-
Program Planning (OP-090)
.
b. Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)
The basis for the Navy's annual budget is its
Program Objectives Memorandum as modified by the various
SECDEF decision documents (i.e., PDMs , PBDs) . The budget
expresses, in appropriation format, the financial require-
ments to support approved Navy programs which were developed
during the preceding planning and programming phases. The
budget submission covers three years:
(1) the actual obligations for the prior year,
(2) estimated obligations for the current year
and
,
(3) estimated obligations for the budget year
(i.e., the fiscal year immediately following that in which




Appropriation sponsors and program sponsors in CNO guide
and assist the component organizations of the Navy in the
development of budget estimates within their purview.
c. Five Year Defense Program (FYDP)
The Five Year Defense Program establishes the
planned force structure and financial levels for the military
departments for a five-year period. The FiDP is formulated
annually on the basis of SECDEF decisions in response to the
POMs submitted by the military departments. The FYDP is the
summary of approved five-year programs for all Department of
Defense components (military departments plus the defense
agencies) . The FYDP projects force requirements for eight
years and manpower and cost data (associated with approved
programs) for five years. It is the official program of the
Department of Defense and is updated as changes occur in
accordance with the PPBS . In order to ensure that decisions
made during the planning and programming phases are implemented
by proper allocation and expenditure of resources, information
is collected and evaluated in terms of meaningful categories
called "Programs." The ten programs now used are as follows
/"Ref. 9J-
(1) Strategic Forces
(2) General Purpose Forces
(3) Intelligence and Communications
(*0 Airlift and Sealift
(5) Guard and Reserve Forces
(6) Research and Development
23

(7) Central Supply Maintenance
(8) Training, Medical, and Other General
Personnel Activities
(9) Administration and Associated Activities
(10) Support of other Nations
Each of the programs is divided into categories called
"program elements." All operations of the Department of the
Navy, represented by the departmental organizations, field
activities, and operating forces are assigned to one or more
of the program elements. The Unit Identification Code (UIC)
,
which is assigned to each of these organizations, activities,
and forces, provides the link between appropriations and
programs. The account structure of elements within the
programs is designed to satisfy many requirements but, in
general, it is able to produce total costs displayed in two
ways
:
(1) organization oriented for management use, and
(2) mission oriented for planning and programming
use .
Within the details of the ten programs, the Department of the
Navy must account for all personnel, every ship and station,
all material, and every dollar available to the Department.
d. OPNAV Sponsorship Roles /~Ref . 8_7
The concept of sponsorship is intended to facili-
tate overall direction of Navy programs by assigning coordi-
nating responsibilities where the activities of several
2h

participating organizations are involved. Sponsorship roles
within OPNAV include Mission Sponsor, Function Sponsor,
Program Sponsor, and Appropriation Sponsor.
A Mission Sponsor is responsible for developing
the overall goals, objectives, rationale, justification and
resource requirements for a specified Mission area. Imple-
menting programs to obtain the overall goals and objectives
must be time-phased to available technology, production
capacity, and fiscal constraints. The Mission Sponsor has
"birth to death" interest in the systems under his cognizance
with reliance on other types of sponsorship for appropriate
emphasis at different phases in the systems 1 life cycles.
The Mission Sponsor determines the priority
ranking of programs or parts of programs under his cognizance.
The order of priority cannot be realigned by Appropriation
Sponsors without the concurrence of the Mission Sponsor.





A Function Sponsor is responsible for the prepa-
ration, substantiation, and justification of a Navy position
on the level, composition and related direct support for a
force, platform or support area. The Function Sponsor
receives guidance from the Mission Sponsor relative to mission












- Military Assistance OP-06
A Program Sponsor is responsible for determining
program objectives, time phased support requirements, and
for appraising progress, readiness, and military worth for
a given weapon system function or task in support of the
goals and objectives of the appropriate Mission Sponsor. The
Program Sponsor is the primary Navy spokesman on matters
related to the progress of the particular program.
An Appropriation Sponsor is responsible for
supervisory control over an appropriation. Resource allo-
cation must satisfy the Mission Sponsors' goal and objectives
and support the force levels and program objectives of the
Function and Program Sponsor. The Appropriation Sponsor
functions as the primary Navy spokesman on matters relating
to the resource requirements of various programs and must
coordinate with Mission and Program Sponsors to ensure that
a balanced presentation of these requirements is made.
26

Program Sponsors are responsible for effecting
coordination with Appropriation Sponsors when dollar resources
become or threaten to become insufficient to meet program
requirements. Similarly, Appropriation Sponsors are responsi-
ble for effecting coordination with cognizant Program Sponsors
when formulating financial programs affecting resource
requirements for approved programs.
k. Navy Budgeting Process /~Ref . 2_7
The Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) is responsible
for setting the procedures for preparation and administration
of the Navy's budget. He consolidates budget formulation
guidance received from several sources, both at the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Department of the
Navy (DON) level, and furnishes this information to all
echelons in a single document known as the "budget call."
The Comptroller's staff receives and reviews the
budget estimates compiled in response to the budget call and
then coordinates with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) for appropriations
concerning their respective missions in order to discern and
reconcile differences of opinion. The Comptroller then makes
recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy for his consider-
ation.
The Comptroller and his staff supervise the revision
of budget estimates to reflect the decisions of the Secretary
of the Navy and prepare the formal summary submission to the
27

Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
.
The staff analysts participate
in and coordinate hearings with OSD and Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) examiners involving Department of the Navy
appropriations. The analysts obtain additional supporting
data for the Navy's budget and assist in the preparation of
responses to proposed OSD budget decisions. When final de-
cisions of the Secretary of Defense, OMB and the President
are communicated to the Department of the Navy, the NAVCOMPT
staff arranges for preparation of the Navy's budget schedules
for the President's Budget. They also assemble the justifi-
cations and other data needed to support the budget estimates
before Congress. The Comptroller, with his staff, directs
the budget process during Congressional hearings concerning
the Navy's appropriations by providing appropriate represen-
tation, by supplying additional information requested by the
Appropriations Committees, and by performing a continuing
financial liaison function with the Congress.
Following enactment of an appropriation, it is gener-
ally necessary to submit an apportionment request to OMB and
OSD. The basic purpose of the apportionment procedure is to
prevent obligating annual funds at a rate that depletes
available funds well before the end of the fiscal vear.
Funds are therefore requested and allocated in terms of
a quarterly basis to avoid such deficiencies. The Comptroller
guides the preparation of apportionment requests and support-
ing material, reviews the estimates of the various Department
28

of the Navy Components, and makes the formal submission to
OSD. The apportionment request in effect constitutes the
financial plan for executing the budgeted program. As in
the case of a budget request, it is reviewed jointly by OSD
and 0MB examiners with hearings scheduled as required.
Prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, OSD pro-
vides to the Department of the Navy a schedule of financial
authority (or operating budget for operations accounts)
which establishes the responsibility for control of each
appropriation. This includes controls at levels below the
appropriation total and any other statutory or administrative
limitations. Within these controls and limitations the
Comptroller allocates funds to the Chief of Naval Operations
for the purpose of operations, military personnel, and
military construction under Navy Appropriations.
During the apportionment preparation and review prior
to the beginning of the fiscal year, CNO sponsors participate
in the various levels of review and hearings. The Comptroller
allocates funds provided by the appropriations Operation and
Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) and Operation and Maintenance, Navy,
Reserve (O&MNR) to CNO, The OPNAV Fiscal Management Division
(0P-92) , with guidance from the Director of Navy Program
Planning (0P-090), establishes operating budgets for the
major claimants to the Operations, Navy account. The major
claimants in turn make funds available to subordinate echelons
29

(see Figure II-l, Appropriation Fund Flow). The Comptroller
also allocates the major Navy Accounts for procurement :
Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN)
, Weapons Procurement, Navy
(WPN)
, and Other Procurement, Navy (OPN); military personnel;
Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) and Reserve Personnel, Navy
(RPN) ; and military construction ; Military Construction,
Navy (MCN) and Military Construction, Naval Reserve (MCNR)
to CNO
.
Again, funding levels are determined and sub-allo-
cations are made to subordinate echelons. (NOTE: There is
no Naval Reserve Procurement Appropriation.)
Throughout the course of the fiscal year or the life
of the appropriation, the Comptroller's staff conducts a
continuous review of financial performance against budgetary
plans and programs. When performance indicates to the
administrators of the various appropriations or funds the
need for additional apportionment, reallocation or reprogra.m-
ming of available funds, or, in some cases, the need for
supplemental appropriations, they submit appropriate documen-
tation to the Comptroller to support the desired change. The
Comptroller's office reviews the request, forwards it to OSD
if action is required at that level, and passes any revised
allocations to the funds administrators.
30

APPROPRIATION FUND FLOW /~Ref. 10, 11 7




















1. Congress annually enacts
appropriations for DOD by fiscal
year. One sub-title under these
Acts is: OPERATION AND MAINTE-
NANCE, NAVY RESERVE.
2. The President approves the ap-
propriation and signs it into law.
3. After the appropriation becomes
lav/, the Treasury issues a
warrent , countersigned by GAO,
to the proper department.
ty. 0MB apportions funds to the Navy,
usually on a quarterly basis,
subject to the approval of OSD.
5. OSD reviews and approves Navy
apportionment requests going to
0MB and releases the approved
apportionment from 0MB~ to NAVCOMPT.
6. NAVCOMPT', who submits apportion-
ment requests to 0MB via DOD,
receives the apportionment and
allocates these funds to OP-92.
7. OP-92 allocates funds to various
major claimants through issuance
of operating budgets.
8. Chief of Naval Reserve, who
receives allocations as a ma.jor
claimant, issues operating
budgets to his various responsi-




9. The Commanding Officer of NARU
Alameda, a responsibility center,
upon receiving his RESOURCE
AUTHORIZATION (which is assigned
on a quarterly basis) informs his
cost centers as to their quarterly
expenditure level.
10. Each cost center obligates/expends





C. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (RMSs)
The Resource Management Systems, which have been developed
to improve management at all levels throughout the Department
of Defense, consist of four interrelated subsystems
/"Ref. 12_7 :
(1) Programming and Budgeting.
(2) Management of Resources and Operating Units.
(3) Management of Inventory and Similar Assets.
(t+) Management of Acquisition, Use, and Disposition of
Capital Assets.
Item (2), the subsystem for the management of resources for
operating units, involves the Operations and Maintenance and
Military Personnel Appropriations. These appropriations
represent the major portion of the Navy Budget. To improve
the management of these resources the Department of Defense
implemented Project PRIME (PRiority Management Effort)
.
D. PROJECT PRIME (RMS)
Project PRIME was implemented as a revised system for
internal budgeting and accounting for operations of the
armed forces /~Ref . 13_7- This new system was to provide
for expense accounting in terms of the FYDP and obligation
and disbursement reporting in terms of the appropriations
made available for Operations and Maintenance and Military
Personnel. It was designed, therefore, to provide both
information that could be used for internal DOD management
needs in terms of the FYDP and information to fully support
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external budgeting considerations in terms of the existing
appropriation structure. It was to establish the essential
missing link betv/een planning/programming data and budget
data.
1. Pre -PRIME Problems
The Department of Defense had been making decisions
in terms of the FYDP for several years, however, financial
management of operations was not consistent with the
Department's mission as depicted in the FYDP; therefore, a
significant gap in the management process existed. Command
management, which conformed to the FYDP mission/decision
structure, was not entirely consistent with financial
management and management control.
The authority for the use of resources did not always
match the responsibility given to commanders for mission
accomplishment. To the extent that this situation existed,
the commander v/as inhibited in taking the resource actions
necessary to fulfill his mission responsibilities.
The existing accounting structure did not produce
information on actual resources used in the categories in
which planning decisions were made. Therefore, information
that could be used for determining whether cost estimates
had been relatively accurate, and/or that could be used as
a basis for future planning in like terms, was not readily
available
.
Because the existing accounting system had not been
structured in the terms used in planning, top managers found
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it difficult, and in some case nearly impossible, to determine
whether the decisions they had made had been implemented in
the way that was intended. This was not the case for major
decisions, but for the greatest number of actions it was
often difficult to follow decisions through to their imple-
mentation.
2. Internal Management Needs
Through Project PRIME, the Department of Defense
sought to establish consistency between the financial manage-
ment of operations and the planning and command structure by
internal budgeting and accounting with a new standard account
structure. The classifications within internal operating
budgets were to be the structure of the FYDP. The major
aspects of internal financial management (budget preparation,
internal budget analysis, issuance of financial authority,
accounting and review) were to focus on programs and missions.
Accounting reports were to be in terms of programs, thereby
focusing internal management review on the total operating





In addition to being summarized in terms of the FYDP
structure, expenses were to be identified by functional
category and element of expense. A functional categorv was
to be a type of activity within a program for which the
expenses were incurred, such as maintenance, supply, and
mission operations. Elements of expense were to represent
3^

the kind of resources used, such as supplies, fuel and oil,
or civilian labor. These classifications v/ere to ensure that
data was available in the detail and classifications needed
for budget review at various levels, especially the review by
the Congress of Department of Defense appropriation requests.
k . Unit Identification Code: Program/Budget Dat a Link
The new system was to enable the Department of Defense
to meet the requirement for internal management in the terms
in which it made its plans, without affecting the availability
of information in the conventional budget activity classifi-
cations. This link between planning/programming data and
budget data was established by assigning each operating budget
holder a Unit Identification Code (UIC) /~Ref . 1^J7. For the
Navy, the Navy Programming Manual lists program elements and
the Navy Comptroller maintains a current dictionary of assign-
ments of organizational units to program elements (See Figure
II-2: UIC as PROGRAM/BUDGET DATA LINK).
5. Post-PRIME Problems
Project PRIME (RMS) was implemented I July 19 68. In
1973, the Naval Audit Service Northwest Region was directed
to conduct a service -wide audit of RMS reporting procedures
to determine the responsiveness of RMS to the management of
resources by operating units /^""Ref . 15_7»
Audit coverage included:
(1) the preparation and utilization of RMS reports.
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(3) the extent of duplication between financial and
cost reporting, and the feasibility of developing uniform data
to satisfy both requirements
.
(4) the additional reporting requirements imposed on
shore field activities by higher echelons.
(5) consideration of the interrelation of RMS with
other resource management systems, particularly with the
system for programming and budgeting and the system for
management of inventory and similar assets.
The implementation of RMS introduced to operations
funded from & M appropriations, accounting and management
concepts such as accural-basis accounting, total activity
costing (including military personnel costs), and performance
measurements using work units.
At the time RMS was under development, DOD anticipated
that each Service's future operations would be funded by a
single "Operations" appropriation instead of by separate
Military Personnel and Operation and Maintenance appropriations
and RMS was designed accordingly.
A high level of interest in RMS problems by top Navy
management led to the selection of RMS for servicewide audit.
Because DOD operations continue to be funded by
separate appropriations and RMS had not been appropriately
modified to satisfy management needs under present funding
arrangements, a major problem exists. This and other system-





RMS requires substantial modifications if it is to
be fully responsive to local management needs. Corrective
actions, v/hich were already underway in many instances, made
any further recommendations by the auditors unnecessary.
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III. THE NAVAL RESERVE AND THE TOTAL
FORCE POLICY /"Ref . l6_7
Members of the National Guard and Reserve...
will be the initial and primary source for
augmentation of the active forces in any future
emergency requiring a rapid and substantial
expansion of the active forces _/Ref. 1_/.
The nation's total force concept has become a total force
policy which has the full support of the Congress, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the services. The Navy is
approaching the task of making the total force a reality with
full recognition and acceptance of the vital role that the
Naval Reserve has played in the past and the increased role
it must play in the future.
Because of rapidly changing active force structure and
levels, and other uncontrollable factors, coordinated plan-
ning for active and Reserve forces has not been consistently
achieved. This situation is being rectified. First, it was
realized that there was no one office in the OPNAV staff
responsible for the total force. Total force planning coordi-
nation responsibility is now held by one of the Plans, Policy
and Operations branches. Next a decision was made to adopt
a sequential approach to the problem:
(1) Develop a basic policy to define the role of the
Reserve component in the Navy total force.
(2) Refine the structure and rationalize the size of
the Reserve component in accordance with this policy.
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(3) Correlate and update all of the Navy's mobilization
plans to optimize the total force contribution in execution
of the national strategy.
A. CNO NAVAL RESERVE POLICY
On 25 October 197^ the Chief of Naval Operations promul-
gated his new Naval Reserve policy /~~Ref
. 1?_7. It is
essential that one underlying premise of that policy, which
is fundamental to the Navy's approach in planning, be under-
stood. That premise, given the probable character and
duration of any future war, is that the size of the Navy
total force is driven primarily by the number of minimally
capable ships and aircraft in service or reserve at the
time .
There is then a practical maximum size of total force
defined by factors essentially beyond the control of the
Navy: it is a total hardware inventory characterized by a
modernizing input added at the top while units of marginal
combat effectiveness are retired at the bottom. This means
that the Navy can achieve a total force based on pure
"requirements" for either a "worst case" or "probable case"
contingency, only if the threat to the national interest or
the Navy's mission diminishes drastically and neither is
likely in the foreseeable future.
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B. NAVAL RESERVE SIZE AND STRUCTURE
The initial effort to define the size and structure of
the Naval Reserve focused on the manpower requirements of the
Selected Reserve. This is an area that the Navy has had major
problems in obtaining OSD and Congressional funding support.
The Navy's previous inability to produce tight rationale and
detailed justification for the numbers requested has led to
recent strength cuts which have contributed so much to the
present turmoil in the Naval Reserve Community.
First, the manpower requirements of those organized
reserve units with organic equipment (ships, aircraft squadrons,
construction battalions, cargo handling battalions, inshore
undersea warfare units, etc.) were reviewed and validated.
These units represented the earliest increments of capability
that could be added to the active component and they warranted
Selected Reserve manning in entirety. As a starting point,
the units programmed to be supported in the currently approved
Five Year Defense Plan were examined. The mission of each
unit was verified and then the manpower allocations to each
unit were screened and validated.
Next the augmentation manpower requirements for the
active force ships, squadrons and afloat staffs were con-
sidered. The baseline used was the most current mobilization
manpower allocation/requirement plan (M-MARP) . The Mobiliza-
tion Day Increments reported in the M-MARP were examined for
reasonability and accepted as properly allocable to the
*u

Selected Reserve. Further efforts will be needed to refine
the figures, but there is now an increased order of confidence
in the validity of these new preliminary totals.
The final step, which is also an ongoing one, was to
examine the augmentation requirements for the shore establish-
ment. This is a formidable task, since the size of the shore
establishment has an imprecise relation to: the size of the
force being supported, the locale and duration of a conflict,
the time-phasing of the buildup to support the engaged forces,
the realistic absorption rate of existing and reactivated
facilities, and many other factors. As a starting point,
the more than 7,000 activities currently listed in the M-MARP
are being reviewed for the criticality of M-Day requirements.
Those critical activities having the earliest mobilization
requirements are considered properly allocable to the Selected
Reserve
.
C. TOTAL MOBILIZATION PLANNING
Using the new Naval Reserve Policy as one benchmark and
two "worst case" scenarios (one in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean and one in the Pacific) as another, the Navy
is reviewing the existing operation plans of the major commands
involved. This is being done to revalidate the time-phased
total naval force requirements under the two scenarios. These
requirements will be compared with the programmed total force
to determine the hardware shortfalls which must be made up
from other mobilization assets or new construction.
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Having refined these hardware parameters, the Navy can
revalidate the phased requirements to man these units. There
will also be a firmer basis for establishing the similarly
time-phased shore establishment requirements. There are
several sources available to supply the required manpower.
First the Ready Reserve, then new enlistees, the Inactive
Reserve, Fleet Reserve, and similar reservoirs of experienced
personnel would be mobilized.
Having revalidated the size of the operating forces and
supporting shore establishment at various stages through full
mobilization, the Navy can proceed to update and correlate
all of the many supporting mobilization plans. Then plans
for the Selected Reserve can be refined and a better basis
for sizing and structuring the Ready Reserve will be avail-
able. In this way the Navy can ensure a coherent organization
and structure that not only makes the total force a reality







MANAGEMENT OF THE NAVAL RESERVE
Funding is policy and in no place is this
more apparent then in the budgeting process in
the Department of Defense /Ref
. 18_/.
We must remember always that the basic
element of strength in any nation is not in
its machines but in its manhood /~Ref
. 19_7-
BERNARD BRODIE, A GUIDE TO NAVAL STRATEGY
There are three very fundamental management principles
contained in the above statements: policy points the way
toward achieving organizational goals, and funding substanti-
ates or denies the forcefulness of policy statements, but it
is always people and their attitudes that determine whether
or not policy becomes reality.
As stated in Chapter I, INTRODUCTION, the purpose of this
thesis is threefold:
(1) The first purpose is to explore the evolution of the
financial management system used by the Department of Defense
and how the Department of the Navy interfaces with the current
process. Understanding of the funding process is essential
because it is within the financial management system of an
organization that many of its policies are substained or
rendered lifeless. Chapter II, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE/DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, fulfilled this
requirement.
(2) The second purpose is to examine development of the
Naval Reserve role in the Navy's emerging Total Force Policy.
^

Because of President Johnson's decision in 1965 to use
draftees for expansion of the war in Vietnam, the Reserves
were pre-empted in their role as "the initial and primary
source for augmentation of the active forces /~Ref. 20_7."
Therefore, it was necessary to ensure awareness of the current
role of the Naval Reserve under the Navy's Total Force Policy.
Chapter III, THE; NAVAL RESERVE AND THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY,
attempted to accomplish this purpose by making it clear that
the Chief of Naval Operations intends for the Naval Reserve
to "be ready to fulfill its vital role of supplementing the
active forces in accordance with the Navy's Total Force Policy.
(3) The third purpose is to evaluate progress with key
Naval Reserve management problems which affect attainment of
the Navy's Total Force Policy. This chapter deals with three
major problem areas: funding , attitudes , and education.
The basic approach to the first two problem areas centers
around the Reserve Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act of
I967 (Vitalization Act). First, the existence of problems is
suggested by examining trends in legislation leading up to
and including the Vitalization Act. Then, the persistence of
these problems is confirmed by reference to recent management
literature, interviews v/ith Navy managers, and/or personal
experience. Finally, current progress with these problems is
outlined and evaluated. The third area, education, is of
special interest because it is through the use of effective
educational techniques that the systems and attitudes of men





The basic rationale for maintaining reserve
forces rests on economic grounds. If resources
were unlimited, enough active forces could be
maintained to meet all possible contingencies.
Or if forward deployments or early deployments
were considered unnecessary, all forces could
be reserves. Since neither is the case, some
mix of those forces provides maximum military
capability within a given budget level/~Ref ." 1_7»
Given the rationale for maintaining reserve forces, and
given the Navy's legal requirement to support and develop
these forces, one might agree that proper funding of these
forces should be forthcoming. As the following discussion




By the Naval Reserve Act of 192S, Congress tasked the
Secretary of the Navy with supporting and funding the Naval
Reserve as follows:
In support of the Naval Reserve , the
Secretary of the Navy is to make available
vessels, material, armament, equipment, and
other facilities of the Regular Navy, as he
deems necessary for its development Funds
necessary for the support of the Naval Reserve
are authorized to be appropriated annually
from the Treasury. The Secretary of the
Navy will submit annually, with the estimates
of the Navy Department ... the estimated amount
necessary for all purposes for the Fleet
Naval Reserve. . . /Ref. 21_7-
The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 /~Ref . 22_J7
reaffirmed the responsibility of each Service Secretary to
maintain mobilization forces by proper planning and budgeting,
The Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act of
^6

19^7 /~Ref . 23_7 stated that the Secretary of the Navy is
responsible for providing the personnel, equipment, facili-
tates, and other general logistic support necessary to enable
units and individual Reservists of the Naval Reserve to
satisfy the training and mobilization readiness requirements
recommended by the Secretary of the Navy and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense. The trend
indicated by the Acts cited here is that of increasing emphasis
on the responsibility of the Navy to adequately fund and
support its Reserves. This trend suggests that adequate
funding arid support of the Naval Reserve has been a continuing
problem area.
2. Persistent Problems
A recently conducted Naval Reserve Management Study
/~Ref . 2 i!4_7 confirmed the existence of inadequate procedures
for properly funding and supporting the Naval Reserve. The
problems delineated by the study emphasized five basic issues
in the area of funding and support:
(1) PPBS Inputs
there was no centralized coordination of
Reserve planning, programming, or budgeting of resources.
exercise of the Reserve Program Sponsor role
was inconsistent and, in some instances, virtually non-
existent.
inclusion of Reserve requirements in the
Navy's POM had been fragmented.
4'

( 2) Major Claimancy
- major claimancy was important in establishing
and influencing Reserve resource allocations.
(3) Command Line Funding
the principle of command line funding had
been violated in the case of the Naval Air Reserve.
the anomaly of separate dollar flow and
command lines had caused management problems for the Reserves.
( ty ) RMS Procedures
- RMS principles and guidance would have to be
followed if the Reserve were to better manage its resources.
(5) Resource Separation
Reserve resource requirements had not been
visible to most Navy Department financial managers.
3 . Current Progress
A great deal of progress has been made in the area of
funding and support of the Naval Reserve; however, much more
remains to be done before a sufficiently effective balance is
reached in the resource allocation/budget execution process.
Progress with problems in this area will be presented in
three phases with specific reference to the problems listed
in the preceding section (IV.A.2.).
a. PPBS Inputs
On 21 August 1970, the Secretary of Defense issued
a memorandum /~Ref . 2^_7 to the Secretaries of the Military
Departments. This memorandum emphasized the Total Force
^8

Concept and demanded that Reserve planning be concurrent
with active force planning. Progress with problems involving
Naval Reserve participation in the DOD resource allocation
process has been substantial. The Office of the Director of
Naval Reserve (0P-09R) has been established under the Chief
of Naval Operations in Washington, D. C. OP-09R is Appropri-
ation Sponsor for the O&MNR , RPN , and MCNR appropriations.
0P-09R is also the Program Sponsor for designated elements of
programs, and as such has a POM Development/Programming Branch
in its Resources Programming Division (see Appendix C)
.
That the Department of the Navy is currently
attempting to achieve meaningful support and realistic fund-
ing of the Naval Reserve is further indicated by the follow-
ing excerpt from initial CNO guidance in 197^ for the
development of the Department of the Navy Program Objective
Memorandum for Fiscal Year 197?:
0P-09R will monitor the progress of
POM-77 development, coordinating with
Force and Mission Sponsors as required,
and ensuring that POM resources are
programmed to support the planned role
of the Reserves. Force and Mission
Sponsors will likewise maintain close
liaison with 0P-09R during POM-77
development in order that all issues
which directly affect the Naval
Reserve are properly addressed. In
executing his specific responsibilities,
0P-09R will review and comment on issue
papers relating to mobilization require-
ments, Reserve modernization, and Reserve
force levels (including adequacy of
support to sustain or improve readiness
of these force levels) /~Ref . 25_/.
^9

b. Major Claimancy/Command Line Funding/RMS
Procedures
On 12 August 1969, the Secretary of Defense
issued a memorandum /~~Ref
. 2hJ to the Secretaries of the
Military Departments assigning control of funds designated
for Reserve forces to the Chiefs of the Reserve Components.
The Chief of Nava3. Reserve is now a major claimant v/ho is
responsible for Naval Reserve budget formulation, justifi-
cation, allocation, execution, accounting, and reporting.
A review of the management of the FY -?k O&MNR
appropriation at MRU Alameda /~Ref . 11__7 provides a good
example of current Naval Air Reserve Financial management
(RMS) procedures. By Public Law 92-570 /"Ref. 28_7, Congress
established O&MNR as a separate appropriation for the Naval
Reserve. This appropriation was designated 17-1806. The
subheads to be used under this appropriation are as shown
in Figure IV- 1 (OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, NAVY RESERVE
APPROPRIATION)
.
On 16 June 1972, Commander Naval Air Reserve
(COMNAR) issued a Budget Call for FY-74 to NARU Alameda
(UIC 63139) , which is one of its Responsibility Centers
/~Ref. 1^_7- Instructions and forms for the preparation
and submission of the FY-7^ NAVCOMPT Budget were provided.
On Ik June 1972, the Commanding Officer of NARU Alameda had
anticipated the COMNAR Budget Call by issuing a Budget Call
for FY-7^ to his Cost Centers. On 12 July 1972 NARU Alameda
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OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY, RESERVE
APPROPRIATION /~Ref
. 26, 27, 28_7
By Public Lav; 92-570, Congress established a separate
appropriation for Naval Reserve operation and maintenance,
Within the appropriation three Budget Activities were
established: BA-1 Mission Forces, BA-2 Depot Maintenance,
and BA-3 Other Support. The appropriation is identified as
17_ 1806.
17 Navy
Fiscal Year (see 1751806 below: FY 1975)
1806 Operation & Maintenance, Navy Reserve





















NOTES: (1) The Chief of Naval Reserve, as a major claimant,
is assigned Unit Identification Code (UIC) 72.
(2) CNARES as major claimant submits type "B" reports
to CNO at the .7210 (BA-1), .7220 (BA-2), and
.7230 (BA-3) level.
(3) NAVCOMFT Form 2168-1 is used in making subhead
. 7211/. 7231/. 7212/. 7222/. 7232 resources available
to OB holders. Subheads .7233/. 723^ (special
"self -heir/' projects are centrally managed by







-7^ funding requirements to COMNAR. Requested
funds were broken down by Functional/Subfunctional Categories,
Budget Classification CodeFj, and Elements of Expense as
required by RMS procedures. On k April 1973, COMNAR issued
the FY- 7k Apportionment Call to its Responsibility Centers.
On 23 April 1973, NARU Alameda submitted its updated FY-7^-
funding requirements with justifications. On 23 August 1973,
COMNAR provided NARU Alameda with its operating Budget for
FY-7^- in two parts. One part v/as a Resource Authorization
(NAYCOMPT FORM 2168-1) under appropriation number 17^1806,
subhead .7211 and the other part was a Resource Authorization
under the same appropriation, subhead .7231. On 26 September
1973 , NARU submitted its updated Financial Plan as required
by RMS procedures.
The problems concerning major claimancy and command
line funding have been fundamentally solved. As has been
stated, the Chief of Naval Reserve is a major claimant.
Furthermore, requests for and allocation of funds now go up
and down the chain of command as outlined above. As far as
RMS procedures are concerned, reference to the example af-
forded by NARU Alameda's management of its FY-7^ O&MNR
appropriation and a review of applicable Chief of Naval
Reserve instructions /~Ref. 26, 27, 28_7 indicate that RMS
procedures have been instituted and are being followed by the
Naval Reserve. Discussions with the NARU Alameda Deputy
Comptroller /~Ref . 11_7 reveal that the Reserves experience
the same difficulties as the Regulars /~Ref. 15 and 29_7




On 2h May 1971, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs) issued a DOD Directive
/f~Ref
. 30_7 which directed the Secretaries of the Military
Departments to "assure that Guard and Reserve forces are
funded, equipped, manned and trained, and given sufficient
logistical support, to ensure their readiness for active duty
and deployment in accordance with contingency plans and
planning, programming, and budget guidance."
Procurement of Reserve equipment and supplies was
to be accomplished through the existing Service procurement
system and budgeting for major Reserve equipment needs was
to be under the active force procurement appropriation.
However, separate program and budget identification for Reserve
component funds were to be established and the Military
Departments were to maintain separate records for all Reserve
funding and separate controls over encumbrance of those funds.
The Chief of Naval Reserve was to be responsible
for justifying Naval Reserve requirements and through estab-
lished financial management channels was to manage the funds
appropriated by Congress for Reserve personnel (RPN) , operation
and maintenance (O&MNR), and construction (MCNR) programs.
Requests for diversion of resources originally budgeted in
support of Reserve activities to other than Reserve support





These provisions for separation and protection
of funds and equipment programmed for Reserve use have been
steps of major importance in ensuring proper support and
funding of the Naval Reserve. However, the author is of the
opinion that Regular/Reserve competition for scarce resources
continues to adversely affect Reserve combat-readiness.
During interviews with personnel associated with budget
execution, the author was led to believe that sometimes
funds allocated for Reserve use were expended for Regular
use without Reserve concurrence. Examples were cited, but
when the matter was pursued The consensus of those involved
was that pinning down specific details and individuals would
be very difficult and more harmful than beneficial. The shift
of funds might have been justifiable in some of the alleged
instances, but one thing is certain: the Reserve Units for
which the funds were originally intended did not increase
their combat-readiness as a result of the transaction. Work
is continuing in the area of fencing funds intended for
Reserve use. A good example of progress in this matter is
a recent change concerning aircraft procurement (APN) funds
/"~Ref . 31_/> Funds for modification of Reserve aircraft
under the Modification Account (APN-5) . are to be listed
separately beginning with the FY-?6 Budget. This increased
visibility of Reserve resource requirements is a very impor-
tant step toward ensuring that funds allocated for Reserve




A sharpening of /"the competition between
Regular and Reserve_7 was reflected by a key
Pentagon official in testimony presented to
the Senate Armed Services Committee, in which
he identified as one of the major constraints
to the development of a visible and credible
reserve force "ingrained attitudes- the 'we
versus they' approach-the declination of
responsibility for Guard/Reserve problems-the
view that any move to upgrade reserves would
downgrade Active Forces / Ref . 1_J?"
On 28 February 1925 Congress acted to provide for the
creation, organization, administration, and maintenance of
a Naval Reserve. The introduction to the Naval Reserve Act
of 1925 reads:
...the Naval Reserve Force, established
under the Act of August 29, 1916, is hereby
abolished, and in lieu thereof there is hereby
created and established, as a component part of
the United States Navy, a Naval Reserve ....
/""emphasis added_7 /~Ref
. 21_7-
Congress intended the Naval Reserve to be "a component
part of United States Navy," not an ineffectual appendage to
be cut adrift in a sea of frustrating ambivalence or simmering
hostility because of a lack of command attention on the part
of those to whom Congress had entrusted its development. Yet
a perusal of the laws that have been passed since 1925 for
the purpose of providing the United States wi th a readily-
responsive, combat-ready Naval Reserve, reveals the hard-to-
ignore fact that each successive law shows that Congress felt
it necessary to stress Regular/Reserve unity in an attempt
to turn around the self-perpetuating problem of a poor
Regular/Reserve working relationship and to preserve the
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Reserve viewpoint. This problem of Regular/Reserve attitudes




Although the Regular Navy and the Naval Reserve were
supposed to operate together as an efficient, integrated team
from the very beginning, the fact is that the Regular Navy
has never accepted the Naval Reserve as a full-fledged
partner.
In the 1938 /~Re±. 32_7, Congress reiterated its
intention that the Naval Reserve be a component part of the
United States Navy. It also directed that a Naval Reserve
Policy Board be established for the purpose of advising the
Secretary of the Navy on the formulation of Reserve policies.
The Board was to be convened annually at the Navy Department
and at least half the members were to be Naval Reserve offi-
cers called to this duty from an inactive duty status. The
latter requirement would ensure presentation of the Reserve
viewpoint.
In 1952 /~Ref . 22_7, it was written into law that
"the bureaus and offices of the Navy were to hold the same
relation and responsibility to the Naval Reserve as they did
to the Regular Establishment /"and that_7 there shall be no
discrimination between and among members of the Regular and
Reserve components in the administration of laws applicable
to both Regulars and Reserves /"emphasis added_7." jn
addition each of the Armed Forces was directed to maintain
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officer members of their Reserve components on active duty
at the seat of Government and at such headquarters as were
charged with responsibility for Reserve affairs and to
assist and participate in the preparation and administration
of all policies and regulations affecting the Reserves. It
was also at this time that a. Reserve Forces Policy Board was
established in the Department of Defense. These provisions
again indicate a desire on the part of Congress to ensure
adequate presentation of the Reserve point-of-view.
In I967 Z"~Ref ' 23_7» "the then newly established
Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force became members of the Reserve
Forces Policy Board. This Board was to act through the newly
established Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs as the principal policy adviser to the
Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve
components
.
The trend of increasing emphasis on equal treatment
of Reserves and Regulars and added provisions for ensuring
Reserve inputs to policy matters points to a continuing
problem with the Regular/Reserve working relationship.
2. Persistent Problems
In 19^6, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal,
believing the Naval Reserve to be a vital part of the Navy,
tried to establish the principle of integrated management.
The Reserve was to be supported by, and to function with,
the active Navy as a single entity. The Naval Reserve was
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not to be a separate force commanded and administered unto
itself, "but a force to be directly involved with the active
operating forces under the command of the Chief of Naval
Operations. His attempt to institute this concept had
questionable success. As recently as 1972, a Naval Reserve
Management Study sponsored by the then Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Manpower and Naval Reserve) , now Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations (Manpower), OP-01, cited the following
problems as contributing to "a Naval Reserve lacking direction,
visibility, and the resources to be a viable and dynamic
force /"Ref. 33„_7."
The responsibility for general, overall Reserve
program coordination was only suggested by the OP-01 charter
and, likewise, the charters for many ether offices, bureaus,
and commands at the Departmental level did not spell out
completely their responsibilities for support of Reserve
programs. There was no established policy concerning where
the responsibility for Reserve program sponsorship should be
placed. Reserve representation in the conduct of Naval Reserve
business was not uniformly provided, there were areas at the
Departmental level in which Reserve liaison and support
personnel had not oeen assigned, and the unique nature of
Reserve management and program support was not understood.
The existence of these circumstances is another indication
of unintegrated Regulars and Reserves.
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As a Regular Navy officer during the period I96I
through 1969. the author can remember briefings by squadron
commanding officers and department heads to the effect that
the Reserves (who were to be hosted by the squadron during
their two weeks annual active duty) were to be tolerated much
the same as house guests of questionable repute, were not to
be trusted (i.e., lock up everything that is not nailed down),
and they should not exist anyway because the Reserve organ-
ization is a waste of the taxpayers* money. As a Naval Reserve
officer on active duty during the period 1970 through 1973.
the author can recall the lack of communication and cooperation
between Regular Navy commanding officer host and Reserve Navy
commanding officer tenant at an East Cost Naval Air Station.
Poor working relationships among Regulars and Reserves is a
persistent and perplexing problem.
3 . Current Progress
Although progress seems at times to be disc ouragingly
slow in improving the Regular/Reserve working relationship
and in including the Reserve viewpoint in the process of top
level Navy decision-making, organizational and management
changes have been made which hold the promise of better
times.
The Reserve Forces Bill cf Rights and Vitalization
Act of 1967 /~Ref . 23_7 authorized the Secretary of the Navy
to designate a flag officer under his jurisdiction to be
directly responsible for Naval Reserve affairs to the Chief
of Naval Operations. Since that time a Regular Navy Vice
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Admiral (at this time VADM P. N. CHARBONNET, JR.) has been
appointed Chief of Naval Reserve with Headquarters in New
Orleans, Louisiana. In addition, the Naval Air Reserve
(previously located at Glenview, Illinois) and the Surface
Naval Reserve (previously located at Omaha, Nebraska) have
been consolidated under the Chief of Naval Reserve at New
Orleans
,
As previously mentioned, the Chief of Naval Reserve
wears a second hat as Director of Naval Reserve (0P-09R) in
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He maintains
a staff at the Pentagon in Washington, D. C, which is directed
in his absence by a Naval Reserve Rear Admiral (at this time
RADM R. G. ALTMANN) who is Deputy Director of Naval Reserve.
The 0P-09R Staff includes a Naval Reserve Air Plans, Policy
and Programs Division; a Naval Reserve Surface Plans, Policy
and Programs Division; and a Resources Programming Division.
The 0P-09R Staff, which is manned by Naval Reserve officers
who understand the unique nature of Reserve management and
program support, is responsible for overall Reserve program
coordination at the Departmental level. When matters concern-
ing the Naval Reserve arise in the Department of Defense or
Congress, the Chief/Director of Naval Reserve and/or his
Deputy Director, supported by the 0P-09R Staff, are called
upon to provide a coordinated Naval Reserve viewpoint.
The improvements that have been made in the Regular/
Reserve working relationship, although far from sufficient,
have in some cases been encouraging. As Officer-in-Charge
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of a Naval Air Reserve Force Squadron from 1971 to 1973, the
author can recall with pleasure the motivation to achieve
professional excellence and top-rated combat-readiness.
This challenge v/as imparted to Reserve officers and enlisted
men alike by a Regular Navy Air Group Commander who believed
in the vital role of the Naval Air Reserve and encouraged
his squadrons to communicate and cooperate with their Regular
Navy counterparts. The results in many cases were extremely
gratifying v/hen during debriefings following a joint Regular/
Reserve Fleet Exercise, Regular and Reserve Pilots and
Aircrewmen congratulated each other on outstanding perform-
ance and then went out on liberty together. The competition
and camaraderie in those cases were healthy for the Navy's
readiness and invigorating for the Regular/Reserve partici-
pants .
A more recent example of good Regular/Reserve work-
ing relationships stems from Reserve participation in the
Fleet exercise, Springboard '75 /~Ref. 3^_7- Reserve Force
Squadron Air Anti Submarine Squadron Seventy- three operated
from Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, to participate
with Regular Navy units in this exercise. In debrief of the
exercise RADM H. Greer USN , Commander Fleet Air Caribbean,
commended the Reserves for their very professional contri-
bution to the successful completion of the exercise. In
addition, the Commanding Officer of Naval Station Roosevelt
Roads sent a message of appreciation to the squadron upon
their return to the United States:
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Appreciation is expressed for the fine
professional manner in which VS-73 personnel
conducted themselves during their recent
deployment to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads.
The excellent condition upon departure of
spaces and equipment assigned to VS-73 is
also noted. During these periods of austere
funding and manpower shortages it is a pleasure
to host a unit who is willing to go to extra
pains to ensure that the equipment we now
have is kept in top notch operating condition.
VS-73 is welcome back anytime /~Ref
. 35_7-
The Regular/Reserve working relationship can he a
good one when people's attitudes are good and they work at
it.
C. EDUCATION
The importance of postgraduate education
continues to grow in the 1970s as we progress
into an even more demanding technological and
management environment. This development of
the Navy officer corps through advanced
education. .. is an essential part of our
preparedness for future challenges...
/"Ref. 36_7.
ADMIRAL T. H. MOORER
Education as it stands today serves two basic purposes
/"Ref. 37_7 : The first is to sustain an existing culture or
community and the second is to increase that society's capacity
to cope with a changing environment by training leaders capa-
ble of developing new ideas that can be harnessed to the
needs of the people. The essence of the Naval Postgraduate
School's mission is "to conduct and direct the advanced
education of Commissioned Offleers ... to meet the needs of
the Naval Service." As a Naval Reserve officer student in
the Financial Management Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate
School during the period of December 1973 through June 1975.
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the author has observed that knowledge of the Naval Reserve
among professors/instructors and Regular Navy students is
for the most part either lacking or biased and archaic.
Furthermore, the Chief of Naval Reserve has not been invited
to make a presentation at NPS during this time and the course
descriptions in the Management section of the NPS Catalog for
197^-76 make no mention of the Naval Reserve, its practices,
or requirements in the management field. There appears to
be a lack of concern and effort with regard to weaving the
role arid needs of the Naval Reserve into the fabric of the
NPS management thought process. In view of the Navy's reliance
and emphasis on the Total Force Policy this situation repre-
sents a significant weakness in the education of Naval Officers
at NPS.
One of the major problems concerning Naval Reserve manage-
ment that has been considered is that of attitude. The rela-
tionship between education and attitude is a very interesting
one. Psychological research has indicated that "our likes
and dislikes are learned... /~primarily_7 from close contact
with groups which have already formed strong likes and dislikes
toward /~certain_7 psychological objects /f~Ref. 38_7>" Psycho-
logical objects can be symbols, ideas, institutions, or groups
of people. On the foregoing basis, therefore, officers
trained and educated by those with strong negative or indif-
ferent attitudes toward Reserves, are not very likely to
develop favorable or even open attitudes toward Reserves.
How then can the previously discussed self-perpetuating
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negative working relationship between Regulars and Reserves
be brought under control and re-directed in a positive way?
One proven and very promising possibility is through the
transforming power of education.
Another important Navy educational institution is the
Naval War College. Examination of the current brochure being
sent to incoming students /~Ref
. 39_7> a^d perusal of Naval
War College Review articles written in the 1970s /~Ref . ^0_7,
indicate that progress is being made with regard to consider-
ation of the role and viewpoint of the Naval Reserve . The
following is a statement made in the President's report for
1973:
With a firm belief that the "One Navy"
concept applies as much to the field of
professional education as elsewhere, the
War College provides considerable support
to the Naval Reserve. In return, we receive
valuable feedback and stimulation from a
source often overlooked /~Ref . klj/
.
The attitude conveyed by the written statements associated
with the Naval War College is encouraging. Further research
regarding the Naval Reserve viewpoint as a factor in the
educational climates at the Naval Postgraduate School, the
Naval War College, and other Navy educational institutions
could provide beneficial insights for improvement of the






...it is fundamental to realize that the
more heavily your regular forces are committed-
the thinner they are stretched-the more essential
it is that one have a ready and effective Reserve
/~Ref. 20_7.
Congress expects the Nation's Total Force Policy to be of
prime consideration in the Department of Defense decision-
maing process and the Navy is striving to fulfill that
expectation in its area of responsibility. The Navy real-
izes and has emphasized the vital role of the Naval Reserve
in making the Total Force Policy a reality. These facts
have been established in Chapter III, THE NAVAL RESERVE AND
THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY.
As pointed out in Chapter IV, MANAGEMENT OF THE NAVAL
RESERVE, three major problem areas affecting attainment of
the Navy's Total Force Policy goal are: FUNDING, ATTITUDES,
AND EDUCATION. Evaluation of progress with these key Naval
Reserve management problems leads to the following conclusions
and recommendations.
A . FUNDING
A great deal of progress has been made toward proper
funding and support of the Reserves. Chapter IV discussed
in detail many of the organizational changes and management
procedures that have been instituted to improve fund flow
and amount, such as: centralized and coordinated Reserve
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resource requirement inputs to the Navy's POM by 0P-09R,
Chief of Naval Reserve major claimancy, Reserve adherence to
RMS procedures, and improved separation of funds intended
for Reserves. However, as pointed out in Chapter II, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE/DEPARTMENT OF THE
NAVY, and Chapter IV, MANAGEMENT OF THE NAVAL RESERVE, there
is no separate Naval Reserve procurement appropriation and
this allows use of Naval Reserve funds for other than Naval
Reserve purposes on occasion (see Chapter IV). Therefore, a
possibility for further improvement of Naval Reserve support
and funding would be to encourage creation of a Naval Reserve
procurement appropriation or similar method of ensuring that
funds earmarked for improving Naval Reserve Combat-readiness
are not subsequently expended for other purposes.
B. ATTITUDES/EDUCATION
Although the Regular/Reserve working relationship has
been less than satisfactory in far too many instances, this
situation does not have to be accepted as a way of life. As
suggested in Chapter IV, MANAGEMENT OF THE NAVAL RESERVE, one
practical and successfully- implemented practice is to seek
maximum utilization of Naval Reserve units in Regular Navy
Fleet Exercises similar to that participated in by VS-73 in
the Caribbean. Working together to perform a difficult mission
and realizing the value of a team-mate's contribution to a
job well done builds a bond of mutual respect and understanding
that can be gained in few other ways.
< 6

Chapter IV discussed the power of education in transforming
attitudes and thought processes. It is recommended that the
Naval Postgraduate School emphasize the concept of "One Navy"
as the Naval War College seems to have done. Two specific
recommendations for achieving more widespread knowledge and
understanding of the Naval Reserve and its role under the
Navy's Total Force Policy are to:
(1) invite the Chief of Naval Reserve, the Deputy Chief
of Naval Reserve, and/or the Deputy Director of Naval Reserve
to speak at the Naval Postgraduate School on a regular
basis
.
(2) include and expand upon this thesis as part of the
course content for MN ^15^, Financial Management in the Navy,




ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
30 June 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS (FM) DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
SUBJECT: Implementation of Project PRIME in FY I968
The House Appropriations Committee Report on the Defense
I968 Appropriation Bill makes it necessary to reorient and
reschedule Project PRIME, for the improvement of programming,
"budgeting and accounting systems involved in the management
of operating resources:
1. Each Military Service will plan and execute a
demonstration test during FY I968 based on uniform speci-
fications issued on June 23, 19^7
.
2. Outside the components involved in the demonstration
tests, the Military Services and Defense agencies will make
none of the changes scheduled previously to take effect
July 1, 1967. except that:
a. Industrial Fund and Stock Fund extensions will
be limited to those for which the ASD (Comptroller) reconfirms
in writing after the date of this memorandum the approval to
proceed.
b. Functional cost system extensions which are not
associated with PRIME should proceed.
c. Recording and reporting of Military Personnel
expenses as inaugurated October 1, 1966, should continue in
FY 1968.
3. In pursuance of the above policy, changes are being
made in PRIME-related documents, insofar as operations outside
the demonstration tests only, are concerned. These will be
issued as soon as they can be drafted.
Robert N . Anthony




THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Jan k, 197^
MEMORANDUM FOR Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Director of Defense Program Analysis and
Evaluation
Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
Directors of Defense Agencies
SUBJECT: Program/Budget Review - Calendar Year 197^ Schedule
This memorandum expresses the schedule of The more significant
actions of the Calendar Year 197^ PIarming-Programming-
Budgeting cycle. Actions outlined will be accomplished as
prescribed by DOD Instruction 70^5-7 or as modified by this
memorandum.
__
The Planning cycle began on May 24- , 1973 with the publication
and receipt of the Joint Strategic Objective Plan ( JSOP)
,
Volume I. The Planning cycle v/ill be completed February 22,
197^ at which time the Programming cycle will commence with
issuance of the Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum
(PPGM). The PPGM will include the fiscal guidance, material
support planning guidance and specific guidance in such areas
as forces, research and development, telecommunications and
intelligence. The Programming cycle will continue through
the preparation of the Joint Force Memorandum (JFM) , the
Program Objective Memoranda (POMs), the review and analysis
of these documents , the transmittal of tentative Program
Decision Memoranda (PDMs), a reclama cycle, and the publication
of amended PDMs as appropriate. The Programming Cycle will be
considered completed on August 22, 197^
•
The Budgeting cycle will start with the initial issuance of
Budget Guidance on August 22, 197^- • This cycle will continue
through the submission of the annual budget estimates, the
review and evaluation of these estimates by the OSD and 0MB
staffs and xhe transmittal of budget decisions in the form
of PBDs. Additionally, the Budget cycle will include the
update of the FYDP on October 11, 197^ and will be considered
completed after joint meetings with the JCS and the Service
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